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Introduction: Climategate and the ethical dilemma of 
climate policy scientists  
In the last decade the most salient scientific issue for the American 
public has arguably been global warming. From the Kyoto protocol  
in 1997 to the release of An Inconvenient Truth in 2006 to the 2007 
Nobel Peace Prize for that movie and for the United Nations 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s [IPCC] Fourth 
Assessment Report [AR4] support seems to have growing for both 
the fact of anthropogenic warming and the political will to do 
something about it. The AR4 was authored with the participation of 
over 200 climate scientists. Consequently, it was touted as the coup 
de grace for skeptics who had been insisting that there was no 
scientific consensus on evidence of anthropogenic warming.i But just 
two months ago, in November 2009, almost precisely two years after 
the IPCC had won the Nobel Prize, a hacked stream of emails, data, 
code, and images from the Climate Research Unit servers at East 
Anglia university damaged the appearance of consensus achieved in 
the AR4. Many of that document’s authors were implicated in the 
hack, christened “Climategate” by skeptical media outlets, which 
contained emails dishing on internal squabbles, ridiculing  
opposition to the AR4 findings, and weighing “tricks” for presenting 
climate change data persuasively (Revkin, 2009, November 20, para 
3). 
Reactions to Climategate by both the impugned scientists and 
climate change skeptics were immediate and predictable. Skeptics 
hailed the emails as evidence of suspected infighting and political 
biases in the IPCC. They devoted particular attention to hacked 
emails that discussed the famous “hockey stick” graph, which 
formed the centerpiece of the argument for anthropogenic global 
warming in the Third Assessment Report [TAR] released in 2001 
(Figure 1). The graph, which first appeared in Mann, Bradley, and 
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Hughes (1998), showed a rapid increase in temperature in the 20th 
century compared to the otherwise regularly oscillating Northern 
Hemispheric average temperature series. The graph’s appearance 
and the statistical methods used to produce it were the source of 
bitter contention for several years following the AR3’s publication. 
McIntyre and McKitrick’s (2003) charge that Mann et. al. had  
Figure 1: The infamous “hockey stick” graph published first in Mann, 
Bradley and Hughes (1998) and then in the IPCC’s AR3 in 2001. The 
debate concerned the statistical methods used to generate the sharp 
upward spike in departures from average temperature in the 
Northern Hemisphere beginning roughly in 1900. Source: 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/e/ed/Hockey_stick_chart
_ipcc_large.jpg  
mishandled the data input to the graph ultimately sparked a series 
of Congressional hearings. Although these hearings failed to force a 
retraction of the graph, its notoriety was sealed. 
The hacked East Anglia cache contained emails purportedly 
written by members of the TAR authoring team in which they 
expressed private doubts about the statistical methods behind the 
“hockey stick” graph, methods that they would later defend 
vehemently and publicly. This apparent hypocrisy set off avid 
debates on Climate Skeptic and other skeptical blogs about the 
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validity of the TAR and AR4 and their authors’ reputations (Meyer, 
2009, November 23). 
In response, the authors largely avoided reentering the “hockey 
stick” and other old debates. Instead, they strove to insulate their 
professional reputation—or ethos—in various ways, primarily by 
bracketing off their scientific ethos from their ethos as citizens or 
private persons: “Newton may have been an ass, but the theory of 
gravity still works,” argued Gavin Schmidt, a NASA climate scientist 
who admitted to writing some of the hacked emails (Revkin, 2009, 
November 20, para 20). 
Climategate raises many interesting questions for rhetoricians of 
science, although answering them will prove complicated—first 
because of the privacy of the source material and secondly because 
of the questionable authenticity of the fragmentary remnants of the 
necessary data base circulating through skeptical media outlets. 
However, documented reaction to the scandal so far makes at least 
two things clear. The IPCC scientists are having real problems with 
their ethos as “policy scientists”—scientists who advise 
policymakers on science-related civic issues. Moreover, they are 
acutely aware of this ethical instability and of its capacity to hamper 
their ability to persuade publics and policymakers in the court of 
public opinion. 
While some of the ethical attacks on the IPCC in the course of 
Climategate have been launched from predictable, quantitative 
grounds—such as the accuracy of models or the completeness of 
records—the most prevalent and vehement attacks have used the 
climate scientists’ involvement in politics in the first place as 
grounds for discrediting their scientific findings. This line of 
argument is too pervasive to document comprehensively, but here 
are two illustrative examples. In the first, the blogger at Finem 
Respice accuses IPCC scientists of acting for political gain: 
As a group one rarely sees scientists (or, indeed, any vocational 
group other than politicians) so deeply in love with the by-hook-or- 
by-crook of politics, the grand import of jetting off to Nice for the 
next climate meeting and the limelight that accompanies all these 
world-saving goings on as those few, those lucky few exposed in the 
CRU emails… It is all but impossible not to come away with a sense 
of what is plainly a naked lust for naked ambition simply oozing out 
of those texts. I am utterly devoid of sympathy for any such that 
later claim to have been forced to compromise their composure, 
their decorum or their data because of the unfortunate realities of 
politics. ("Their charms proved irresistible," 2009, November 28, 
para 26)  
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Similarly, on his Climate Skeptic blog, Meyer (2009, November 
23) implies that bias is the only reasonable explanation for one AR3 
author’s failure to publish his private concerns (expressed in a 
hacked email) about the “hockey stick” graph: “When we 
understand the incentives that are driving him to suppress his own 
scientific views, and to publicly ridicule those who share his private 
concerns, we will understand better what is broken in the climate 
science process” (para 2). What’s wrong with climate science, in 
other words, is politics. If we refract this warrant through an ethical 
lens, we get the argument that it’s somehow inappropriate for a 
scientist to be involved in politics at all. And yet policy scientists 
regularly feature in the political landscape. In fact, they are  
accreted to it under the auspices of government agencies such as 
the NSF, NIH, and USDA. 
The ethical paradox faced by the American policy scientist is 
well-documented. Steven Shapin (2008) and Roger Pielke, Jr. 
(2007), have recently explored the issue in historical monographs. 
Both tell versions of the same tale. Until the end of the 19th century, 
scientists were expected to moralize the results of their inquiries 
pro bono publico. Starting after the Second World War, however, 
American scientists fell under a philosophical stricture referred to 
as the “is/ought” problem or the “naturalistic fallacy.” This rule, 
stated first by David Hume and elaborated since then by 
philosophers such as A.J. Ayer and scientists such as Albert 
Einstein, holds that democracies cannot make social or moral  
policy based on observations of the natural order. Facts are one 
thing. Values and the choices they undergird are another (Ayer, 
1952; Einstein, 1950; Weber, 2002). 
Shapin and Pielke point to ample historical motivations for the 
“is/ought” stricture in the arguments of the post-WWII writers who 
invoked it, not least the terrifying results of the atomic bomb and 
the nazification of the life sciences. In addition, the post-war 
industrialization of science in America complicated the heroic ethos 
of its practicioners, whose pre-war portrait Sinclair Lewis had 
drawn so lovingly (and, it appeared in retrospect, naively) in 
Arrowsmith. 
However, and in fact because of these motivations for invoking 
it, the “is/ought” rule is impossible to enforce. In practice scientists 
are citizens with their own biases and opinions. These inevitably 
color their policy recommendations. Indeed, governments and 
publics routinely ask scientists to cross the “is/ought” divide in 
order to give advice about how to navigate civic questions related to 
their expertise, such as global warming. The IPCC itself was 
convened by the United Nations under the auspices of its 
Environment Programme; and the Nobel Prize it received for its 
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work in 2007 is evidence of its perception, at some times and in 
some lights, as an activist body. 
These public investitures and the “is/ought” divide combine to 
create the paradoxical ethos policy scientists experience in 21st- 
century America. When scientists make policy recommendations at 
the behest of government agencies, the factions whose politics align 
with these recommendations laud the trustworthiness of the  
source; those whose politics are out of phase accuse the scientists of 
“junk science,” bias, and corruption (cf. (Goklany, 2008; McKitrick, 
2007; McLean, 2008).ii Policy itself founders in the resulting 
impasse over the trustworthiness of the very experts policymakers 
called upon for advice in the first place. 
As we’ve already seen in the scientist-authors’ reactions to 
Climategate, climate policy scientists are keenly aware of their 
fraught ethical stance in the court of public opinion. But in contrast 
to their passive, defensive responses to Climategate to date (which 
may be partially chalked up to the intervention of the Copenhagen 
talks in December 2009), the IPCC had already enacted preemptive 
rhetorical strategies in the AR4 to integrate their fractured ethos.  
In this paper I will focus on one of these strategies—visualizations 
of climate models. In short, I will argue that the visualizations in 
the AR4 SPM integrate the IPCC’s ethos by performing its 
continuity from “is” to “ought” while shifting the burden of proof 
from ethos to logos—the objectified results of the models. These 
visualizations deploy strong emotional or pathos appeals that ease 
the persuasive load on the IPCC’s ethos. While determining the 
effectiveness of these strategies is difficult, I will point to some 
reception evidence that indicates the IPCC’s visual strategies may 
have helped integrate their ethos, at least with some audiences. 
In order to understand how the visualizations could accomplish 
these rhetorical effects on the IPCC’s ethos, it is necessary first to do 
a bit more work with the “is/ought” stricture. While both Shapin 
and Pielke define and make recommendations for amending the 
observed ethical paradox of the policy scientist, neither 
satisfactorily explains how late-modern civic debate generates the 
ethical paradox that Climategate has dramatized so vividly. Casting 
the “is/ought” divide in the light of stasis theory helps explain the 
ethical paradox. Once we see that scientists’ statements at the  
stasis of cause/effect are inevitably interpreted as value judgments 
and policy suggestions, we can explain the ethical paradox and be in 
a better position to evaluate the IPCC’s visual strategies to cope 
with it. 
The paradoxical ethos of the American policy scientist: 
the “is/ought” stricture  
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Shapin’s and Pielke’s accounts have already been sketched, but 
prior to these very recent contributions, the ethos of the American 
scientist had already been amply graphed by philosophers, 
historians, and rhetoricians. Max Weber was one of the earliest and 
most prolific and influential writers on the subject. His The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1958) instituted a 
portrait of scientific ethos molded by Puritan ethics—scientific 
discovery as a reward for faithfulness and a sign of election to 
redemption. This portrait has since been filled out by Shapin 
(1994), Schaffer (1987), Lessl (1989) and  others, who reconstructed 
the early ethos of the scientist as a “priest of nature.” We can infer 
from this vocational portrait that scientists were not only allowed 
but expected to draw conclusions, based on their unprecedented 
access to God’s will and “maker’s knowledge,” about how society 
could be shaped to fit divine order and perhaps even recapture 
some pre-lapsarian comfort (Briggs, 1996, pp 181-183, 195). 
This ethical structure dominated until the influence of Charles 
Darwin’s works and the resulting school of Scientific Naturalism 
exiled metaphysical questions from the purview of scientific inquiry 
(Shapin, 2008). But the Puritan influence was still particularly 
strong in America, which led to a unique ethical configuration for 
the American naturalist (Brown, 1997). While questions of “ought” 
were officially off the table, nonetheless the persistence of the 
inductive model of Early Modern science suggested that correct 
science should lead to correct policy. Pielke calls this uniquely 
American system for integrating science with society the “linear 
model” (2007, p. 12). Scientists were to discover how nature 
worked, and then this information would be “handed off” to the 
civic arena across the “is/ought” divide, where citizens would then 
go on to decide how to apply the scientists’ discoveries to 
technology and policy development. 
The linear model ostensibly preserved the vestiges of Puritan 
teleology in the face of “is/ought” naturalism, but at the cost of an 
integrated ethos for American scientist-citizens. When making 
policy decisions as voters, they somehow had to remove their 
“scientist hat,” and vice versa—a patently ridiculous proposition, 
which Weber sharply criticized in the conclusion to The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1958). No longer able to justify 
their vocation, their “calling,” by divine warrant, American 
scientists had to justify themselves via “mundane passions” such a 
sense of civic responsibility or sheer mercenary interests, both of 
which were supported by large corporations and federal grants for 
Big Science (p. 182). Foucault commented around this time in 
“Truth and Power” on the ethical plight of the resulting “specific 
intellectual,” whose individual aspirations and social utility were 
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now entirely circumscribed by public or private commission (1980, 
pp 126-129). 
How did this new problematic scientific ethos manifest itself in 
social products, including scientific writing? In the 1970s Robert K. 
Merton identified the following normative traits of the new 
scientific culture in the texts they produced—communism (not in 
the political, but in the cooperative sense), disinterestedness, 
organized skepticism, universality, originality, and humility. These 
norms all resonated with the new naturalist view of the scope of 
science. Significantly, they also applied at the community level. Big 
Science had swallowed the scientific individual as an ethical unit. 
Twenty years later, however, Prelli (1997) found textual evidence of 
“counter-norms” that balanced the Mertonian norms: solitariness 
for communism, interestedness for disinterestedness, organized 
dogmatism for organized skepticism, and particularism for 
universalism. Prelli’s findings suggested either that the social 
structure of science had changed substantially in the last twenty 
years, or that the Mertonian ethos had always been a rhetorical 
reflection of the prescriptive (rather than descriptive) nature of the 
linear model. Shapin and Pielke’s recent analyses suggest the latter 
was the case. 
Pielke and Shapin both refer to uncertainty in explaining the 
breakdown of the linear model in practice—but in slightly different 
ways. Pielke qualifies first that the linear model does actually 
function at times—but only in cases of what he terms Tornado 
Politics, in which values are uniform (“Tornados are bad and to be 
avoided”) and uncertainty is limited to nonexistent (“The best thing 
to do in case of a tornado is hide in a basement.”) In these cases, 
scientists’ observations and statements about what is (i.e., “That 
dark funnel is indeed classified as a tornado and it is indeed headed 
directly for this building”) translate unambiguously into policy 
decisions about what ought to be done (“OK, then, the basement it 
is!”). However, Pielke argues, most policy issues are actually 
instances of what he terms Abortion Politics, where decision- 
makers’ values differ significantly, and uncertainty is high—i.e., 
there are a myriad policy options. In these political situations, 
scientific observations, classifications, and identification of causal 
factors are next to useless except as red-herring arguments 
deflecting public attention from the true stasis of argument (2007, 
pp 40-47). 
Shapin also focuses on uncertainty as being the downfall of the 
linear model, but in this case, it is the sheer multiplication of 
uncertainties that Shapin says drives the problematic ethos of the 
late modern policy scientist (2008, p. xv). Shapin does not state but 
implies that the immediate post-War era was somehow less certain; 
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indeed, this is the same era in which scientists’ ethos went relatively 
unchallenged, as they rode a wave of popular good will occasioned 
by technological advances in medicine, commercial agriculture, 
defense, and space exploration. But the proliferation of these 
technologies and of the dilemmas they have brought within our ken 
have generated increasing uncertainty about “the way we live  
now” (Latour, 1993; Shapin, 2008). This increasing uncertainty in 
turn generates more calls to scientists for help making policy 
decisions in an increasingly technical political landscape. 
While both theorists have accurately identified the rift in the 
ethos of the modern American scientist—Mertonian ethos vs. policy 
ethos—neither has satisfactorily explained the paradoxical public 
reaction to scientists in policy debates: critics use scientists’ policy 
statements to attack Mertonian ethos—the very ethos that 
presumably led to their public commission in the first place. 
However, viewing the “is/ought” divide in conjunction with stasis 
theory can illuminate both this reaction and a subtle rhetorical 
strategy for coping with it that the IPCC scientists used in the AR4 
and that Shapin, Pielke, and other scholars have not yet noted. 
The paradoxical ethos of the policy scientist: explanation 
via stasis theory 
At about the same time that scholars of scientific ethos were 
beginning to recognize complications of the linear model of 
scientific and civic integration, rhetoricians were reviving the stases 
as a tool for analyzing civic engagement (Fahnestock and Secor, 
1998; Fleck, 1981). Roman rhetoricians developed the stases to 
describe a sequence (stasis/stases translates as “sticking point/s ,”” 
“step/s,” or “level/s”) of questions and answering arguments used 
by democratic institutions such as the courts or the Senate in 
arriving at policy decisions. The stases move from simpler to more 
complex, and each stasis builds on the answer to the question at the 
previous stasis. For example: 
Fact: What is the condition of the lungs of children exposed to 
cigarette smoke? 
Definition: Would we classify the condition (tarry residue) as 
damage? 
Cause/effect: What is the mechanism of this damage? And/or 
what health effects does the damage produce? 
Value: Are nicotine, tar, and the other causes of lung damage 
worth banning or regulating? Are the health effects life- 
threatening?  
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Action: What policies will we adopt to reverse or prevent the 
damage caused to children’s lungs by the chemicals in 
secondhand smoke?  
Although Fahnestock and Secor (1998) does not deal much with 
it, the stasis of jurisdiction is a meta-stasis at which procedural 
questions are addressed: is this the right venue for considering this 
case? This stasis figures in some models derived from Cicero’s 
(Prelli, 1990, December, p. 317). Since the IPCC is an advisory body 
without a formal jurisdiction, we will not deal much with 
procedural questions, although we can see that in titling their 
summary document Summary for Policy Makers [SPM], the IPCC 
acknowledges that many members of its primary audience have 
jurisdiction in the ruling bodies of their home countries and 
institutions. Further, questions of jurisdiction tend to obscure the 
true paradox inhering in the policy scientist’s ethos, an effect we 
will turn to in a moment. 
Note that the lower stasis questions (fact, definition, cause) are 
ones we commonly turn to scientists to help us answer today. Note 
also, however, that as the questions move up the stases, answering 
them requires engaging the values of communities outside the 
scientific community (parents, lawmakers, etc.) in order to  
establish criteria for evaluation and motivation for action (Fleck, 
1981). 
The “is/ought” schism occurs between the stases of cause/effect 
and value. When scientists restrict their activities—and their public 
announcements—to the lower stases of fact, definition, and cause, 
they are operating within the guidelines of all modern models of 
scientific ethos from the Puritan to the Mertonian. When scientists 
evaluate their findings in terms of “good,” “bad” or any other value 
scale, or when they proceed to suggest actions that would bring 
civic society more in line with practices they consider “good,” they 
are still operating within pre-modern and early modern scientific 
ethos; however, according to the post-war linear model, they have 
transgressed the “is/ought” divide between Mertonian and policy 
ethos. That transgression on first glance looks like a simple 
judgment at the translative stasis, in which the public and 
policymakers tell scientists that they have no jurisdiction in the 
civic arena. But the special character of the rhetorical attacks noted 
in the introduction tells us that more is going on here than a simple 
procedural wrist-slapping. In these attacks, scientists’ statements 
on policy issues are treated not just as out-of-bounds but as 
evidence that the speakers are not real scientists. The attacks use 
the illegitimacy of scientists’ policy ethos to vitiate their Mertonian 
ethos as well. This is the true ethical paradox of the policy scientist.  
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Why would intelligent scientists and policymakers continue to 
perform this futile ritual in debates not just over global warming 
but about stem cell research, nuclear power, and genetic 
engineering? It seems inexplicable until we look more closely at the 
problematic stasis of cause/effect. 
The stases exert an irresistible upward pull on the discourse 
surrounding a particular issue because the answer to a question at 
one stasis generates a question at the one above it (see the 
secondhand smoke example above). So, to revisit Pielke’s example 
of Abortion Politics, we can see that statements about scientific 
facts, well within the province of Mertonian ethos, in fact do 
generate policy-level statements via the power of implication. For 
instance, if we state at the stasis of fact that “Human fetuses have a 
heartbeat at N weeks,” we can immediately feel the policy-level 
implications of such a statement—for example, “I believe nothing 
alive should be killed; therefore, abortion is against my values,” and 
“I should vote against abortion rights.” Values so permeate civic 
inquiry that they determine even the collection and selection of 
elements to observe at the stasis of fact, a dynamic that sociologists 
of science have repeatedly demonstrated for the funding and 
direction of Big Science (Fleck, 1981). 
The upward pull of the stases intensifies at the stasis of cause/ 
effect. This stasis is the bridge between forensic questions on the 
one hand (“is” questions) and epideictic and deliberative questions 
on the other (“ought” questions). Therefore, when scientists are 
asked to determine the causes and effects of phenomena, even 
though these activities are within the purview of Mertonian ethos, 
nevertheless, their statements are perceived as arguments at the 
stases of value and action by rhetorical implicature.iii Nowhere is 
this effect more apparent than in debates over global warming. If 
scientists state that humans are in fact causing climate change, the 
upward pull of the stases insures that policymakers “hear” scientists 
saying that this enormous impact on the earth is so obviously bad 
(value) that it should be avoided (action), even if the scientists are 
careful not to use value or action language. 
Contrary to Pielke’s argument, then, the issue of global warming 
is settled at the stasis of cause/effect because the conclusions we 
draw from it are functionally inevitable given our democracy’s long 
history and practice with the stases of argumentation. It is against 
this revised understanding of the paradoxical ethos of policy 
scientists that I wish to interpret the rhetorical strategies in the 
IPCC’s AR4 SPM, particularly the visual strategies. First, however, a 
brief ethical history of the IPCC is in order.  
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IPCC history and ethos 
The IPCC was authorized in 1988 by World Meteorological 
Organization and United Nations Environment Programme. It is a 
consortium of hundreds of scientists representing member nations 
of the United Nations, and to date it has produced four assessment 
reports on climate change since its founding. The IPCC constructs 
its organizational ethos as follows (emphasis mine): 
The IPCC was established to provide the decision-makers and 
others interested in climate change with an objective source of 
information about climate change. The IPCC does not conduct any 
research nor does it monitor climate related data or parameters. Its 
role is to assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and 
transparent basis the latest scientific, technical and socio- 
economic literature produced worldwide relevant to the 
understanding of the risk of human-induced climate change, its 
observed and projected impacts and options for adaptation and 
mitigation. IPCC reports should be neutral with respect to policy, 
although they need to deal objectively with policy relevant 
scientific, technical and socio economic factors. They should be of 
high scientific and technical standards, and aim to reflect a range 
of views, expertise and wide geographical coverage. (IPCC, 2009, 
para 1) 
The performance of Mertonian ethos is clear in the following 
italicized phrases: 
· “comprehensive, objective, open, and transparent basis” 
· “observed and projected impacts” 
· “neutral with respect to policy” 
· “deal objectively” 
· “high scientific and technical standards” 
· “aim to reflect a range of views, expertise and wide 
geographical coverage” 
The upward pull of the stases exerted on the IPCC as a civic body is 
apparent in the following phrases: 
· “options for adaptation and mitigation” 
· “policy relevant scientific, technical, and socio economic 
factors” 
The acknowledgment of the “is/ought” schism in the linear model is 
evidenced by the bolded “although they need to” interpolated 
between the phrases signaling the Mertonian ethos on the one hand 
and the policy ethos on the other. However, the IPCC also 
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acknowledges their policy ethos when they connect it to their 
Mertonian ethos with the simple “and” conjunction (bolded), 
indicating that all of the stases may be within their purview. 
The IPCC has handled division of labor within its sizeable ranks 
by organizing three working groups, one on the physical science of 
climate change, one on its socio-economic and natural impacts, and 
one on the monitoring and mitigation of greenhouse gases. 
Working Group I issued its SPM in advance of the AR4 in February 
2007. The full AR4 was released in November of that year, and in 
December, the IPCC won the Nobel Peace Prize in conjunction with 
Al Gore for work on the socio-economic effects of global warming. 
With this ethical background, we can turn to considering 
rhetorical strategies in the SPM related to the “is/ought” division 
and the stases. First, I will examine language in the SPM as it 
relates to Mertonian v. policy ethos, as I did for the IPCC’s ethical 
mandate above. The language selected by the authors demonstrates 
their sensitivity to the strictures of Mertonian ethos. I will also 
discuss some of the reaction to the SPM language to support my 
argument that the IPCC was perceived as arguing at the stases of 
value and action although the language of the document was 
restricted to cause/effect. 
Primarily, however, I wish to examine a unique rhetorical 
strategy of ethical integration utilized by the IPCC authors in the 
SPM: visualizations of climate models. The authors presented these 
visualizations in the SPM as well as in follow-up presentations 
across the country. The visualizations perform the continuity of the 
IPCC’s Mertonian and policy ethos and shift the burden of proof 
from that ethos via pathos appeals and objectification of the model 
results. 
Language in the AR4 SPM: Graphing a problematic ethos 
Although my focus in this case study is the visual rhetoric of the 
Working Group I SPM, a brief examination of the language of the 
document establishes that its authors were sensitive to the “is/ 
ought” divide and were careful to restrict their claims to the “is” 
side, the traditional territory of Mertonian ethos, comprising the 
stases of fact, definition, and cause. The introductory paragraph of 
the SPM demonstrates this scope perspicuously [emphasis added]: 
The Working Group I contribution to the IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report describes progress in understanding of the 
human and natural drivers of climate change, observed climate 
change, climate processes and attribution, and estimates of 
projected future climate change. It builds upon past IPCC 
assessments and incorporates new findings from the past six years 
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of research. Scientific progress since the Third Assessment Report 
(TAR) is based upon large amounts of new and more 
comprehensive data, more sophisticated analyses of data, 
improvements in understanding of processes and their simulation 
in models and more extensive exploration of uncertainty ranges. 
(IPCC, 2007a, p.1) 
Table 1 presents the highlighted language in terms of its relation 
to the stases and to Mertonian norms: 
 Fact Definition Cause Value Action 
Communism  
“Working Group 1 
contribution” 
 ? ? 
Disinterestedness “observed”   ? ? 
Organized 
Skepticism 
 
“extensive exploration 
of uncertainty ranges” 
 ? ? 
Universalism  
“builds upon past 
IPCC assessments” 
 ? ? 
Originality 
“incorporates new findings” 
“large amounts of new and 
more comprehensive data” 
“processes” 
“drivers” 
“attribution” 
? ? 
Humility   
“estimates” 
“projected future 
climate change” 
? ? 
N/A  “processes” 
“drivers” 
“attribution” 
? ? 
Table 1: Language in the introduction to the SPM charted in terms of its relation to  
the stases of argument (across) and Mertonian norms of scientific ethos (down). Bold 
column divider symbolizes “is/ought” divide inhering in the linear model of the  
social role of science 
 
 
 
Mertonian ethos is developed via hedges demonstrating humility 
(“estimates,” “projected”) as well as the arguments for the 
objectivity and rigor of the findings in the SPM. Note that 
language indexing value judgments or activism is absent. 
This trend continues throughout the SPM. A particularly 
interesting strategy for communicating universalism (impersonal 
objectivity) and communism (cooperation) is the IPCC authors’ 
adoption of qualitative shorthand for percent likelihood of various 
outcomes, ranging from “virtually certain” to “likely” to “unlikely.” 
In this framework, the likelihood of outcomes such as “a human 
contribution to observed trend” is determined via “expert 
judgment” on the results of statistical analysis, including model 
results (IPCC, 2007b, p. 27).  
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In a few places in the SPM, the authors’ language strays close to 
value judgment through the use of quantifiers that scale up 
predicted effects. For example, the authors write that current levels 
of greenhouse gases “far exceed” pre-industrial norms as judged 
from ice cores (2007a, p. 2) and describe as “very likely” an increase 
in “hot extremes, heat waves, and heavy precipitation” (p. 15). 
While these word choices may seem inflammatory, that rhetorical 
implicature is due to the upward pull of the stases; there are no 
value judgments stated in a term such as “hot extremes”; we as 
readers, rather, immediately link such a phrase to our value 
structures by the equation “hot extremes = bad.” In fact, these 
phrases appear to be an attempt on the authors’ part to use more 
scientific, descriptive language rather than the value-laden terms 
“drought” and “flood.” 
Did this strategy work? Perhaps with some audiences, but many 
readers perceived the Working Group I SPM’s authors to be arguing 
at the policy stases of value and action, even though they had taken 
linguistic pains to avoid this ethical stance. A survey of the critical 
responses yields many of the same types of ethical attacks launched 
in Climategate. A particularly tart example—the right-leaning 
Washington Pest blogger commented, “Anyone who doubts that the 
new IPCC Summary for Policy Makers is an advocacy document is 
ineligible for duty on the jury of reason” (2007, para 1). Other 
critics responded similarly. A blogger running a page entitled “IPCC 
Criticism of the Week” focused on “distorted, misleading, biased” 
statements in the SPM (2008, para 1). Goklany (2008), writing on 
the Cato Institute’s blog in September 2008, took a related IPCC 
document, Working Group II’s SPM, to task for predicting effects 
such as “Hundreds of millions of people exposed to increasing 
water stress.” He argued that the authors selectively focused on 
drought areas rather than areas that would receive more water as a 
result of global warming and termed this omission equivalent to 
“perpetrating a fraud on the readers” (para 14). McLean (2008) 
compiled on the Science and Public Policy Institute blog what he 
claimed was a list of “50 articles that seriously question the 
credibility and integrity of the IPCC's activities and claims,” one of 
which was his own article claiming the SPM authors were biased 
because many of them had previously published scientific papers 
together. Another was a critique of the SPM from the blog spiked by 
Woudhuysen and Kaplinsky (2007). These authors argued that by 
digesting and summarizing the AR4, the SPM was unwittingly 
participating in the fomenting of a “New Scientism” where “doubt, a 
key ingredient of the scientific method, is now out” (para 4). These 
critics performed readings of the IPCC’s claims at the stases of value 
and action and then used them to attack the authors’  
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Mertonian ethos. But the IPCC writing team had other rhetorical 
“tricks” up their sleeves. It was their visual strategies in the AR4 
SPM that enjoyed more success in stabilizing the IPCC’s fractured 
ethos with some audiences. 
Visualizations in the AR4 SPM: Integrating ethos across 
the “is/ought” divide 
The most dramatic rhetorical devices in the SPM, the ones that have 
been copied and posted on blogs throughout the cybersphere, are 
the report’s graphics, most of which represent the results of climate 
models. Computer models are the primary technology of prophecy 
for scientists. Even so, they are methodologically problematic 
because they operate at the ethically fraught stasis of cause/effect. 
Scientists input perceived causal factors and vectors to models and 
retrieve predicted effects. One of the IPCC Synthesis Report authors 
admitted, “All we have is theoretical evidence and modeling 
evidence now. The way we test our models is we run them on 
historic cases, and when they give us some semblance of reality in 
historic cases then we at least have modest confidence in them to 
project the future” (Schneider, 2005, para 8). Martin Parry, an SPM 
author, went to greater length to justify climate models in a BBC 
radio interview after the release of the AR4: 
Orthodox science has difficulty predicting the future, especially 
if we have experienced nothing like it in the past. Computer models 
are essential to these predictions. But to many non-scientists, they 
are an unknown quantity. However, a new development in the 
Fourth Assessment is that it concludes, from an examination of 
29,000 data sets, that the impacts of climate change occurring now 
can be observed everywhere on our planet…This is traditional 
science-based observation and measurement, not ‘arm-waving’  
with computer models. (Parry, 2007, November 13, para 25-28) 
This discussion—with its hedges and justification, its 
performance of classical inductive argumentation—reveals that the 
IPCC authors are aware that basing their conclusions on computer 
models may open them up to further criticisms of their Mertonian 
mandate in public policy debates. The cause/effect stasis of the 
models is not their only difficulty. Since models take assumptions 
as input in addition to observations, their output is conditioned by 
scientists’ best judgments about the nature of the relationship 
between the past, present, and future. In addition, modeling 
exercises primarily arise in response to public calls for scientific 
advice, such as the IPCC’s mandate, quoted above, which includes 
“projected impacts” in the body’s commission. So, models are 
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invoked in response to the very questions of value and action that 
are supposed to remain outside traditional scientific work. 
The limited scholarship on the rhetoric of computer modeling in 
policy situations acknowledges these dynamics but handles them 
differently depending on the orientation of the particular scholars 
in question. In his study of forestry simulations, Luymes stresses 
that the inherent biases of models (in input and parameter 
selection) should be made apparent to its viewers (Luymes, 2001, p. 
201). Meanwhile, Tavakoli and Thorngate just assume that policy 
models will be biased toward desired outcomes, and thus they 
recommend eliding or hiding the methodology of the model to 
increase its power to persuade the client’s audience (Thorngate and 
Tavakoli, 2009, February 6, p. 13). 
The inherent biases of models do not help stabilize the shaky 
ethical ground scientists find themselves standing on when 
addressing policy-leading issues, such as global warming. Advice 
such as Luymes’s has little chance of working when the scientists’ 
audience is not able to understand the technicalities of model 
construction. But the fact remains, as Schneider and Parry both 
argued above, that there is no way around modeling when scientists 
are asked questions about the future. 
Aimee Kendall, in her analysis of the evidentiary status of 
computer simulations, argues that the virtual evidence that models 
can support traditional scientific evidence, rather than 
undermining it: 
Traditionally, scientific evidence falls under the category of 
epistemic or veridical evidence. First-hand observations 
strengthen the validity of the claims that scientists can make 
about lab experiment findings. Simulations, however, qualify as 
virtual evidence, because they rely on virtual observation rather 
than actual. Virtual observation yields important data about a 
problem. The data needn't be conclusive or absolute to lend 
meaning. That [they contain] the virtue of a thing—the worth and 
workings of it—gives [them] the capacity to explain the thing 
itself. (Kendall, 2005, p. 45) 
In other words, climate simulations can add important meaning to 
policy situations without having to be matters of forensic fact. It’s 
how these models are presented and interpreted that can bolster or 
damage scientists’ right to speak on policy issues. 
Of the ten graphics in the SPM, seven are visualizations of the 
results of computer models, and all operate primarily at the 
problematic stasis of cause/effect. More specifically, all graphics in 
the document exhibit one of both of the following characteristics:  
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· time series proceeding from past to future (left to right) 
showing increasing trends 
· color-coding using red to indicate warming effects 
directly or indirectly (as in the concentration of 
greenhouse gases) 
Perhaps the most famous graphic in the SPM is Figure SPM 5, 
versions of which appeared on over a dozen websites and blogs 
during 2007-2008: 
 
Figure 2: Figure SPM 5 showing model output for surface warming 1900-2100. 
Source: http://www.ipcc.ch/graphics/ar4-wg1/jpg/spm5.jpg  
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In terms of the theoretical discussion so far, the vertical line at the 
year 2000 locates both the present and the “is/ought” split: the 
observations to the left fall within the purview of Mertonian ethos 
(past, present) and are colored in somber, definitive black; the 
colored lines to the right represent possible future outcomes 
depending on model parameters, which were defined elsewhere in 
the document. Of these, the most extreme is colored red and 
dominates the visual impression of the graph; the red is alarming 
and implies a value judgment of “bad” that would underwrite 
policies crafted to avoid such a possible future. 
In addition to these somewhat obvious arguments at the stases 
of value and action—performing the policy ethos of the IPCC 
authors—the visualization makes two less obvious rhetorical 
appeals. The first constructs the continuity of the IPCC scientists’ 
ethos from the Mertonian ethos through the stasis of cause (the 
grounds for predicting the future based on the past) to the policy 
ethos; the implicit argument is, if we have the expertise to construct 
these models, you should trust our predictions and our policy 
advice. That argument underwrites the second appeal, which 
transfers the ethos of the expert scientist to the model itself, 
reifying it as a rhetorical object, an occasion for debate and  
analysis. Its rhetorical status is confirmed by its Internet replication 
after the release of the SPM, which sparked online discussions 
about questions such as, which scenario in the graph was really 
most probable? Were the parameters that generated the scenarios 
reasonable and reliable? 
More importantly, however, the visualization of the model 
results reified a rhetorical object that could be critiqued separately; 
i.e., the model might be bad, but the good scientists who made it 
could correct its assumptions and predictions; this was the gist of 
several online discussions, such as a protracted debate between 
Gavin Schmidt of NASA and Roger Pielke, Jr., on Pielke’s science 
policy blog, Prometheus (2008). 
Most of the remaining visualizations in the SPM ran along the 
lines of Figure 2, but some added the dimension of space to create a 
heightened pathos appeal, such as Figure 3 (next page): 
This figure provided a map so readers could locate their homes, 
partially obscured by the red blur of anthropogenic forcing of 
surface temperature (separated by both profile and color from 
natural forcing for effect). The invitation to compare/contrast the 
profiles, coupled with the invocation of “home” for the viewers, is 
designed to invoke pathos responses of identification and alarm. 
The pathos appeals of “hot” and “home” are both intensified in the 
following visualization, Figure 3:  
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Figure 3: Figure SPM 4 with anthropogenic forcing of surface 
temperature in red. Source: http://www.ipcc.ch/graphics/ar4-
wg1/jpg/spm4.jpg  
The projected globes on the right appear to be boiling, no matter 
the extremity of the particular model in question. No one is safe. 
To summarize the analysis of the rhetoric of the visualizations in 
the SPM as they relate to the authors’ ethos: Linear trends perform 
the continuity of the authors’ Mertonian ethos with their policy 
ethos. This is so even in two of the tables, which due to the 
parameters the researchers selected are organized left-to-right with 
time increasing. At the same time, pressure on the authors’ 
personal ethos is eased by the strategies of intensifying pathos 
appeals (“hot” and “home”) and of serving up the output of the 
models as logoi or rhetorical objects for debate. The complex and 
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vivid nature of the models also grab readers’ attention, shifting the 
locus of persuasion away from the ethos of the IPCC authors. 
Performance and reception of the AR4 SPM 
visualizations in the court of public opinion: 
Establishing ethical distance and intensifying pathos 
appeals 
The publication of the AR4 was followed up by a series of lectures at 
universities across the country, during which authors presented key 
graphics from the SPM and gave overviews tailored to particular 
audiences—fellow scientists, voters, policymakers. I attended one of 
these talks at a small technical university, attended by both 
university faculty and members of the public, and found the 
rhetorical strategies listed above reinforced as follows. First, the 
IPCC speaker stood apart from the model results and pointed to 
them with a laser pointer rather than inserting his hand in the 
image to point out aspects of it. This stance performed the 
reification of the predictions and their separation from his personal 
ethos. Second, he performed the continuity of Mertonian and policy 
ethos with repeated left-to-right motions of the laser pointer 
following past-to-future trends on the projected graphics. Finally, 
the speaker added a slide that replicated the “hot spot” strategy 
used in Figure 4 at a regional level; at that scale, those of us in the  
 
Figure 4: Figure SPM 6 with surface temperature projections mapped 
in hot colors. Source: http://www.ipcc.ch/graphics/ar4-wg1/jpg/ 
spm6.jpg  
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audience could pick out the city or mountain range in which we 
lived and observe how much hotter it was predicted to be by 2050. 
Were these strategies recognized by members of the AR4 SPM’s 
audience? I can tell you that the presentation of the “hot” regional 
map at the SPM talk was greeted with an audible gasp from some 
members of the audience. Naturally, this response only indicates 
that the pathos appeals of “hot” and “home” hit their marks with 
some viewers, but there is at least some evidence that the color 
appeals also registered with skeptical scientists. The Fraser 
Institute, a conservative think-tank, issued the “Independent 
Summary for Policy Makers” (McKitrick, 2007) in response to the 
AR4 SPM. This document also makes use of copious model 
visualizations, some of which are explicit revisions of AR4 graphics 
under differing assumptions (Figures 5 and 6). The Fraser authors 
use the same time series and the same overall color scheme 
throughout the document, but overall they employ the “cool” colors 
of blue and black to underwrite their argument against 
anthropogenic forcing of climate change. 
 
Figure 5: Figure ISPM 9, revision of AR4 6-10b with the color series 
altered to foreground cool tones. Compare with Figure 6. 
Source: http://www.fraserinstitute.org/Commerce.Web/product_files/ 
IndependentSummary5.pdf 
While the specific arguments implied by the models in the ISPM 
and the SPM are diametrically opposed, the Fraser report replicates 
the SPM’s overall rhetorical strategies: visualizations, performances 
of continuity, and pathos appeals. Therefore, while contesting the 
IPCC’s conclusions, it appears that the Fraser authors nonetheless 
share the IPCC’s opinion of the effectiveness of these strategies for 
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an audience of policymakers. Furthermore, the Fraser’s replication 
and discussion of so many of the IPCC’s graphics is an indirect 
indicator that the IPCC authors succeeded at least partially in 
shifting the locus of criticism away from their fractured ethos and 
toward the objectified model results. 
 
 
Figure 6: AR4 6-10b. Source: http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
graphics/ar4-wg1/jpg/fig-6-10.jpg  
Another intriguing piece of circumstantial evidence for the 
effectiveness of the visual and other strategies of ethical integration 
in the AR4 SPM is a sharp spike in the use of the phrase “global 
warming denier” in Internet news sources coinciding with the 
report’s publication. Google Timeline, which graphs the occurrence 
of search terms on Web news sites and blogs over time, shows that 
instances of the term nearly doubled between January 2007 (98 
uses) and February 2007 (182 uses), the month the Working Group 
I SPM was pre-released. Since that month, the term has remained 
in higher currency in Internet news than it has during any previous 
epoch in Web history. What is the significance of this trend? 
“Denier” is a much stronger term than “skeptic,” implying willful 
disbelief. It has been applied to those who deny the existence of the 
Holocaust and other human atrocities. Using this epithet, therefore, 
means taking a serious ethical risk for news writers, who are in 
general are enjoined to eschew ad hominem attacks, even in op/ed 
pieces. If twice as many news sites were willing to take this risk 
after the publication of the SPM, it suggests that they felt licensed 
by the consensus findings of the report—which in turn suggests that 
the IPCC succeeded in projecting an integrated ethos, thus  
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establishing their findings as scientific fact rather than as the mere 
opinions of a fractious and biased advocacy think-tank. 
Conclusion: Ethos, Pathos, and Logos in the IPCC Report 
An analysis of the rhetoric of model visualizations in the AR4 SPM 
reveals the SPM authors attempted to re-integrate their ethos 
before policymakers and members of the public via a performance 
of ethical continuity. That they acknowledged an “is/ought” divide 
in their ethos is clear from their linguistic choices in the document, 
as they were careful to use verbs and nouns consistent with 
Mertonian ethos. To re-integrate their ethos, the IPCC authors 
visualized its continuity across the “is/ought” divide, substituted 
models for people as critical objects, and used color strategically to 
create fear-based pathos appeals. The strategies’ ultimate 
persuasive success is indeterminate; however, their replication in a 
major rival policy publication as well as the increase in ad hominem 
attacks against skeptics by Internet news sources following the 
SPM’s publication indirectly support their effectiveness. That the 
AR4 SPM in toto stabilized rather than destabilized the IPCC’s 
ethos is evident in the Nobel Prize it received in December 2007. 
While the visualizations may represent a locally effective 
strategy for performing ethical re-integration, bodies such as the 
IPCC can continue to expect statements about cause and effect, and 
models at that stasis, to be interpreted as value judgments and 
policy recommendations due to the upward pull of the stases—no 
matter how much they protest that these arguments are “neutral 
with respect to policy” (IPCC, 2009, para 1). Are there 
comprehensive solutions to the ethical paradox faced by policy 
scientists advising the United States government? 
Pielke, Jr.’s (2007) suggests a solution that would ironically 
intensify the “is/ought” stricture by more sharply delineating the 
Mertonian ethos of the scientist from his/her “policy” ethos. The 
scientist accomplishes this ethical feat in Pielke’s scheme by eliding 
the “I” or “we” from policy recommendations, instead presenting a 
range of policy options to decision-makers without endorsing 
particular outcomes. Pielke calls this model the “honest broker” 
model and contrasts it with the “stealth issue advocacy” that results 
during Abortion Politics-type debates when scientists—in at 
attempt to re-integrate their Mertonian ethos with their citizen or 
policy ethos—present policy (“ought”) as scientific fact (“is”); Pielke 
points to remote sensing of weapons of mass destruction in advance 
of the Iraq War as a particularly notorious example of a few 
technical experts pushing policy with the engine of “fact” (2007, p. 
99).  
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The litmus test, Pielke explains, for distinguishing the “stealth 
issue advocate” from the “honest broker of policy alternatives” is 
“the latter seeks to reduce the scope of available choice, while the 
former seeks to expand (or at least clarify) the scope of  
choice” (2007, p. 18), a definition which raises an interesting 
problem for his proposal to re-integrate the fractured ethos of the 
policy scientist. His solution assumes two points: 1. that the 
multiplication of policy alternatives will appear to enforce the 
“objectivity” norm of the scientists’ Mertonian ethos, and 2. that the 
scientist can somehow anticipate all relevant policy alternatives. 
The first assumption may hold, but as for the second, Pielke himself 
states elsewhere real policy situations often feature “fundamental, 
irreducible uncertainty about the problem and policy options” (p. 
52). In these situations, Pielke’s “honest broker” by definition must 
limit policy options using his/her best judgment. Thus, by Pielke’s 
own criteria, the “honest broker” becomes vulnerable to the 
criticisms leveled at “stealth issue advocates.” 
Shapin (2008) primarily examines science policy decisions 
made in the private sector and the world of venture capitalists, but 
the implication of concluding his history of the American scientist 
with a venture-capital case study is not lost on the reader: The 
private sector may become the primary technoscience policy arena 
in the United States. In the overwhelmingly technical and 
breakneck world Shapin describes, venture capitalists resort to pre- 
modern rhetorical grounds for deciding which projects to fund: it’s 
largely about trust, personal familiarity, and whether a scientist 
comes across to his/her potential investors as “good people” (2008, 
282-303). Thus, Shapin argues that the drive to simplify a 
fundamentally uncertain policy landscape may lead us to bypass the 
“is/ought” stricture and place our future in the hands of trusted 
individuals. 
Perhaps policy scientists can re-integrate their ethos by using 
“tricks” such as the visualizations in the AR4 SPM. Perhaps Pielke, 
Jr. (2007) is right, and clearly delineating the scientific facts from 
the policy alternatives will alleviate the pressure on policy  
scientists’ ethos. However, even if these integrative strategies 
succeed, it is likely given the long history of the “is/ought” stricture 
that ethical criticism of policy scientists will merely shift up-stasis 
in response. Critiques of policy scientists will then target their 
“withholding” or selecting of certain policy alternatives as biased 
political decisions. These strategies were nascent in some responses 
to the SPM (Goklany, 2008; Woudhuysen and Kaplinsky, 2007) 
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and have already been realized in some critics’ interpretation of 
comments in the Climategate emails as evidence that IPCC authors 
were subverting peer review and suppressing antithetical views 
(Knappenberger, 2009, December 2; Tracinski, 2009, November 
24; Watson, 2009, November 23). Unless and until the social 
position of the policy scientist is radically restructured in America— 
perhaps through privatization, as obliquely predicted by Shapin’s 
absorbing study of American venture-capitalism—public debate of 
scientific issues in the United States will continue to turn on the 
ethos of the citizens we have engaged to advise us. 
© Lynda Walsh, 2010. 
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Notes 
 
i Blogs such as climateark.org, climateprogress.org, realclimate.org, 
and greenfacts.org contain multiple references to the significance of 
the AR4, especially with respect to whether the scientific consensus 
on anthropogenic warming should be judged skeptically. For a  
more centrist example of the same rhetoric, see Oppenheimer et. 
al.’s “Climate Change: The Limits of Consensus,” Science 14 
September 2007: 1505-1506. This article’s title belies its actual 
argument. It warns that the unprecedented consensus reflected in 
the AR4 may mislead policymakers into downplaying or ignoring 
some of the more dire possible outcomes of anthropogenic warming 
that had been excluded from the IPCC consensus. 
 
ii Lest I give the impression that these ethical attacks are lobbed 
only at the scientists who recommend (or whose work grounds 
recommendations of) activism against anthropogenic warming, 
there are myriad examples of exactly the same types of arguments 
leveled against skeptical scientists. Just a few quick examples to 
illustrate: Michael Mann refers to McKitrick and McIntyre’s (2003) 
criticisms of the methods behind Mann’s famous “hockey stick” 
graph as “refuted claims…by two Canadians (an economist and an 
oil industry consultant),” obviously implying the researchers’ 
industry connections cast aspersions on their scientific findings: 
quoted in (Schmidt, 2006, July 14). And Crooked Timber (Quiggin, 
2006, January 4) lumps McKitrick with “’sceptics’ [who] are not, as 
they claim, fearless seekers after scientific truth, but ideological 
partisans and paid advocates, presenting dishonest arguments for a 
predetermined party-line conclusion” (para. 6).  
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iii Implicature is the logical process by which an unstated but 
understood proposition is generated by a different utterance within 
a habitual system  of communication; e.g., irony is an example of 
implicature at work. See Grice (1975). 
